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I. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Entrapment
One of the Supreme Court decisions of the last term that has
generated much publicity is Jacobson v. United States.' The defendant
had raised an entrapment defense, which required the government to
prove that he was predisposed to commit the offense of receiving child
pornography through the mails.2 The jury had been instructed on en-
trapment but rejected the defendant's claim.3 The Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction and held that the prosecution had failed, as a
matter of law, to adduce evidence to support the jury verdict that the
defendant "was independently predisposed to commit the crime. ' 4
The prosecution of Jacobson was based upon his ordering, through
a government sting operation, a magazine depicting young boys engaged
in sexual activities.' The government had acquired the defendant's name
from the mailing list of a bookstore which had sold him two magazines
containing photographs of nude preteen and teenage boys. 6 After the
government acquired his name, it made him the target of twenty-six
months of repeated mailings and communications before he ordered the
child pornography which was the subject of the prosecution. The mailings
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law
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1. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992). As an example of some of the publicity generated by
the opinion, see New York Times, April 7, 1992, p. Al.
2. Although in the nature of an affirmative defense, when the entrapment defense
is tendered, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was predisposed, independent of the government's actions, to commit the criminal act.
See Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-47.
3. Id. at 1540 n.1.
4. Id. at 1537.
5. Id. Jacobson was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A), "Child
Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (Act), which criminalizes the
knowing receipt through the mails of a 'visual depiction [that] involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct ... ' (alterations in original). Id.
6. At the time of this earlier ordering, the purchase of these materials was legal.
Id. at 1538.
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represented that the fictitious organizations were founded to protect and
promote sexual freedom and freedom of choice and that they promoted
lobbying efforts to protect free speech through catalog sales.7
One must be careful not to read too much into the Jacobson opinion.
Justice O'Connor cautions that the opinion might be misread by lower
courts as requiring the government to have "sufficient evidence" of the
defendant's predisposition before it makes contact with him.8 This con-
cern may, in part, have been based on comments made by the Court
in footnote two of the opinion. There, the Court discussed the internal
guidelines that the government had imposed upon itself to regulate
undercover investigations. Those guidelines required that no inducement
should be given unless there is a "reasonable indication" or "reason
for believing" that the subject was predisposed. 9
*However, at no point did the Court indicate that this "reasonable
indication" or "reason for believing" was in any other way a requirement
before the government could begin an undercover sting operation. In
fact, all indications in the opinion are to the contrary.' 0 The Court
discussed in substantial detail the pervasive governmental efforts to entice
the defendant into ordering the magazines. What appeared to be of
particular significance to the Court was the fact that some of the five
fictitous organizations represented that they promoted sexual freedom
and freedom of choice and would promote anti-censorship lobbying
through sales revenues. 1
The dissent argued that the entrapment defense as defined by the
majority was an expansion on the Court's earlier cases. Justice O'Con-
nor, writing in dissent, noted that there were at least two changes in
the Court's present analysis:
(1) The government must prove predisposition existed prior to
the government's contact (not merely prior to solicitation); and
(2) Predisposition must be to knowingly commit a crime and
not just to engage in illegal conduct.' 2
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1540 n.2.
10. See, e.g.:
Had the agents in this case simply offered [the defendant] the opportunity to
order child pornography through the mails, and [he]-who must be presumed
to know the law-had promptly availed himself of this criminal opportunity,
it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury instruction.
Id. at 1541 (citing Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66, 108 S. Ct. 883, 886 (1988)).
11. The Court found that "by waving the banner of individual rights and disparaging
the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict the availability of sexually explicit
materials, the government not only excited [the defendant's] interest .. .but also exerted
substantial pressure" on him to order the magazines. Id. at 1542.
12. Id. at 1544-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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As to Justice O'Connor's first claim, it is true that in reaching its
conclusion the Court reasoned that a defendant not only must be pre-
disposed at the time of the solicitation but he also must be "predisposed
to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by government
agents." 13 The majority disagreed, however, with the expansion char-
acterization, contending that its reasoning was consistent with that em-
ployed in Sorrells v. United States. 4 It would appear that the fairest
thing to say about this dispute between the majority and the dissent is
that the Sorrells case was not a definitive resolution of this issue.15
However, if the underlying rationale for the entrapment defense is that
a person should not be prosecuted for criminal activity instigated by
the government,16 it should not matter whether the activity of the gov-
ernment which caused the disposition came before or after the solici-
tation.
Justice O'Connor was also correct in concluding that the majority's
opinion in Jacobson requires not only predisposition to do the act but
predisposition to do an act which is criminal.17 In rejecting the argument
that Jacobson's earlier ordering of similar materials proved predispo-
sition, the Court stated: "Evidence of predisposition to do what once
was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show predisposition to do what
is now illegal, for there is a common understanding that most people
obey the law even when they disapprove of it."8 Thus, a defendant's
13. Id. at 1540.
14. 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210 (1932).
15. The majority's quotation from Sorrells, in which the Court stated,
the Government may not punish an individual "for an alleged offense which
is the product of the creative activity of its own officials" and that in such a
case the Government "is in no position to object to evidence of the activities
of its representatives in relation to the accused,"
does not definitely state at which point predisposition must exist. Jacobson v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 n.2 (1992) (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451, 53 S. Ct. at
216).
16. In Sorrells, the Court stated:
[I]t is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established law of
the land to punish a man for the commission of an offense of the like of
which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently
never would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired,
incited, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to commit it.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 444-45, 53 S. Ct. at 214.
17. Once again, one must question whether this is truly a change in the law. In
Sorrells, there was evidence that the defendant had engaged in similar activity prior to
prohibition. Then after prohibition and following what the Court found to be improper
solicitation, the Sorrells defendant engaged in the activity again, this time after it was
made illegal by prohibition laws. Despite this prior activity, the Court concluded that the
defendant was not predisposed within the meaning of the entrapment doctrine. Id. at
441, 53 S. Ct. at 212.
18. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
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predisposition to do an act when it was legal is not sufficient evidence
of predisposition;1 9 predisposition to do a criminal act is required.
B. Feticide or Murder?
In State v. Keller,20 the defendant had filed a motion to quash an
indictment charging him with first degree murder. The charge was based
on the defendant's alleged killing of a mother and fetus. The defendant
contended that since the fetus was not a human being, 2' he could only
be charged with second degree murder. 22 In both Gyles and Brown, the
issue involved whether a fetus, which is not born alive, is a human
being within the meaning of the Louisiana homicide statute. Relying on
the presumption that the legislature intends criminal statutes to have
their common law meaning (unless sufficient evidence of legislative intent
to the contrary is manifested), the supreme court held that such a fetus
was not a human being and could not be the victim of a murder as
defined by the Louisiana legislature.
23
The court of appeal in Keller distinguished the Louisiana Supreme
Court cases relied upon by the defendant. The court of appeal found
itself constrained to conclude that a fetus is not a human being for
purposes of the homicide statutes.2 It noted, however, that first degree
19. The presumption of knowledge of the law employed in the Court's analysis, see
112 S. Ct. at 1540, is somewhat inconsistent with the Court's reasoning that "most people
obey the law" because of a disinclination to violate the law. See 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
Since the presumed knowledge of the law is merely a legal fiction, it cannot act as the
incentive which leads most to obey the law. As such, the way one acts prior to the
passage of a law is indicative of the way he would act after the passage of a law which
he is merely presumed to know. Of course, in the Jacobson case it appears that some
of the mailings to the defendant made it fairly evident that his actions would have been
in violation of the law, so this comment might not hold true in that case.
20. 592 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 594 So. 2d 878 (La.
1992) (allowing defendant to raise issue again following a conviction).
21. See State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979) and State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d
799 (La. 1975).
22. As relevant for that case, the difference between first and second degree murder
is that the former requires intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on more than one
person, and the latter 6nly requires such intent as to one person. Compare La. R.S.
14:30 and 30.1 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
23. Brown, 378 So. 2d at 918; Gyles, 313 So. 2d at 802. Subsequent to these decisions,
the Louisiana legislature has provided for the drime of feticide. See La. R.S. 14:32.5-
32.8 (Supp. 1992).
24. Keller, 592 So. 2d at 1366. The indictment in question had alleged the "first
degree murder of one Andrea Simmons and of the unborn fetus (sic) being carried by
[her]." Id. at n.l. To this extent, the indictment could have been read as alleging the
murder of the fetus. The court of appeal rejected any claim that such an allegation
rendered the indictment invalid. The court relied upon the earlier Louisiana Supreme
Court opinion in State v. James, 339 So. 2d 741 (La. 1976). When faced with an almost
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murder does not require the killing of more than one human being but
only the killing of a single human being with "the specific intent to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm on more than one person." 25 The
court held that it does not matter that one of the persons is not a
human being (one born alive) but a fetus. To support this conclusion,
the court of appeal relied upon the definition of first degree murder
and of "person," which is provided in Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:2(7). 26
Since the supreme court denial of review specifically disclaimed any
attempt to either criticize or approve of the court of appeal's ruling,2
the answer to the issue presented in Keller will have to await another
day. The court of appeal is correct when it points out that the first
degree murder statute employs the word "person." However, the su-
preme court's decision in Brown is, in part, based on the notion that
the legislature is prohibited from making an implicit amendment to
Louisiana's murder provisions. 2 Although the amendment recognized by
the court of appeal in Keller would be less implicit than that argued
for by the State in Brown, it would still be based on implication. The
1976 amendment was not an amendment to the homicide statute but
only an amendment to the definitional statute (Louisiana Revised Statutes
14:2), which amendment might have had other effects.29 Only time will
tell if this implicit amendment is sufficiently clear to withstand the
identical indictment in James, the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that the surplus
allegation (which was not based in law) did not prejudice the defendant who had only
been convicted of the murder of the mother.
25. Keller, 592 So. 2d at 1367 n.l (emphasis added). See La. R.S. 14:30 (1986 &
Supp. 1992).
26. "'Person' includes a human being from the moment of fertilization and implan-
tation ..... " La. R.S. 14:2(7) (1986 and Supp. 1992). The amendment to the definition
of "person" was adopted in 1976 (1976 La. Acts No. 256, § I), in what some contend
was an apparent attempt to overrule the Louisiana Supreme Court's 1975 decision in
Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799. See, e.g., Brown, 378 So. 2d at 918 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
27. Keller, 594 So. 2d 878.
28. In Brown, the court rejected the argument that the 1976 amendment to La. R.S.
14:2(7) was designed to overrule Gyles. It stated:
Other jurisdictions that have proscribed the killing of a fetus as homicide have
done so by separate enactments. The Louisiana legislature has not, as other
legislatures have, clearly addressed the question of feticide as a category of
homicide.
... Therefore, ... feticide [cannot] be made a crime by implication.
... If the homicide statutes are to be amended to include feticide it must
be done with greater clarity and less confusion than the amendment of the
definition of the word "person" reflects ....
Brown, 378 So.' 2d at 917-18.
29. For example, the amendment to the definition of "person" could have affected
the definition of battery. See La. R.S. 14:33-35. Accordingly, even under the facts of
Keller, the purported amendment to the homicide provisions might have been attempted
by merely amending the definition of "person," which approach was rejected in Brown.
See supra note 28.
1993l
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prohibition discussed in Brown. The question must also be raised as to
whether the legislature's adoption of the feticide statutes is an indication
that the legislature intended that the killing of a fetus be regulated by
these specific statutes rather than the general murder provisions.3 0
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Seizure of the Person
In California v. Hodari D., 3 the Supreme Court of the United
States addressed the heretofore elusive question of what constitutes a
seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.,2
This issue arose because the defendant threw down a packet containing
crack cocaine while being chased by the police. The defendant contended
that the chase by the police was an unlawful seizure and that the evidence
he threw down was the fruit of that unlawful seizure. The State of
California contended that the chase was not a seizure and, therefore,
that the abandonment of the evidence33 was not the result of any Fourth
Amendment regulated conduct.3 4
30. See State v. Fruge, 204 So. 2d 287, 291 (La. 1967) (explaining that where conduct
falls within the terms of a general provision but is more specifically covered by another
provision, any doubt as to whether the conduct is regulated by the general provision
should be resolved in the negative).
31. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
32. See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
33. It will not always be clear whether an abandonment had taken place when the
suspect throws away evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561 (10th
Cir. 1991). In Morgan, the court held that a robbery suspect had abandoned a nylon
gym bag when he threw it onto the porch of an acquaintance's house after he was unable
to gain entry to the house during his pursuit by police. Circuit Judge Seymour, however,
dissented, concluding there was no abandonment. Id. at 1576.
34. The Supreme Court was not called upon to address the question of whether the
police possessed sufficient suspicion to justify an investigatory detention. The State of
California had conceded that there was no reasonable suspicion. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct.
at 1549 n.l. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority and quoting from chapter 28 of
Proverbs, verse 1 ("The wicked flee when no man pursueth"), seemed to criticize the
concession by California but noted that "[w]e do not decide that point here, but rely
entirely upon the State's concession." Id. Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice
Marshall in dissent, responded:
The Court's gratuitous quotation from Proverbs 28:1 ... mistakenly assumes
that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden approach of strangers.
We have previously considered, and rejected, this ivory-towered analysis of the
real world for it fails to describe the experience of many residents, particularly
if they are members of a minority. See generally Johnson, Race and the Decision
to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214 (1983). It has long been "a matter of
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The majority concluded that the answer to the question of what
constitutes a seizure of the person lies in the definition of arrest at
common law." The Court found that, at common law, an arrest was
effected either by "the mere grasping or application of physical force
with lawful authority whether or not it succeeded in subduing the
arrestee" 3 6 or the submission of the detainee to the show of authority
even if there were no contact.3 7 The Court then concluded that seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted in
the same manner. 3
The Court found that "an arrest is effected by the slightest appli-
cation of physical force," but noted that if the arrestee escapes "that
[is not to say] for Fourth Amendment purposes there is a continuing
arrest during the period of fugitivity.'' 39 It stated:
If, for example, [the officer] had laid his hands upon Hodari
to arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and had then cast
away the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say that that
disclosure had been made during the course of an arrest. 40
The dissent took exception to this dictum. The dissent reasoned that
whether the abandonment was during the arrest is not the relevant inquiry
and that the inquiry should focus on whether the arrest caused the
abandonment. 4' It appears that the dicta in the majority opinion will,
in the proper case, have to yield to the better reasoned position of the
dissent on this issue. Such a case may arise where the defendant im-
mediately throws away the item upon being physically contacted and as
a direct result of the contact. To the extent that' the abandonment of
the item is caused by the touching (the seizure), the Court would have
to at least consider whether this fruit was sufficiently attenuated froni
common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from
the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties,
or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted
axiom of criminal law that 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the
righteous are as bold as a lion."'
Id. at 1553 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting from Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S.
499, 511, 16 S. Ct. 864, 868 (1896)).
35. Id. at 1549-50. However, at the same time, that Court rejected the notion that
simply because at English common law an attempted unlawful arrest gave rise to a cause
of action in tort such attempted arrests should be considered seizures within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that "neither usage nor common-law
tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure." Id. at 1550-51 n.2 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 1550.
37. Id. at 1551.
38. Id. at 1550-51.
39. Id. at 1550.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1552-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1993]
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the "poisonous tree. ' 42 Under these facts, it appears that there would
not be sufficient attenuation of the taint, and the evidence would be
inadmissible.
Although the dissent appears to have the better argument regarding
the abandonment, its analysis on the issue of what constitutes a seizure
is subject to criticism. In substantial part, the dissent contends that the
interpretation given to seizure in the Hodari D. case is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's earlier expansion of the definition of seizure in
the cases of Katz v. United States43 and Terry v. Ohio.4 However, at
no point does the dissent justify why Katz and Terry ought to be the
a priori point for the definition of seizure.
4 1
Initially, it appeared that the United States Supreme Court's position
in Hodari D. was not consistent with the requirements under Louisiana
law. In State v. Saia,46 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, "The police
cannot approach citizens under circumstances that make it seem as if
some form of detention is imminent unless they have probable cause
to arrest the individual or reasonable grounds to detain .. . . -41 How-
ever, shortly after the United States Supreme Court announced the
decision in Hodari D., the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a per curiam
opinion reversing and remanding to the lower court a case involving
the Hodari D. issue. 4 The Louisiana Supreme Court instructed the lower
court that the case should be reconsidered in light of Hodari D.49
42. United States v. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963).
This analysis, of course, assumes the invalidity of the initial seizure. If the initial seizure
is valid, then there is no poisonous tree to taint the fruit.
43. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
44. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
45. The dissent concedes that Katz and Terry were expansions of the definition. The
dissent states that the "narrow view of 'seizure,' . . . is at odds with the broader view
adopted by this Court [in Katz]" and "[t]he expansive construction of the word 'seizure'
in the Katz case provided an appropriate predicate for the Court's holding in [Terry]."
California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1554-55 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
None of this comment should be construed to mean that the author agrees with the
narrower definition as opposed to the broader definition of seizure. No position is being
taken in this article on that issue. What is being suggested is that the starting point of
the analysis of the definition should not be the Court's prior interpretation but (as the
majority at least purported to do) the Fourth Amendment itself. See generally Eulis
Simien, Jr., It is a Constitution We are Expounding, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 67 (1990).
46. 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974).
47. Id. at 873 (emphasis added).
48. State v. Guilyot, 584 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1991).
49. Id.; see also State v. Green, 598 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (citing
Hodari D but finding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop); State v. Francise,
597 So. 2d 28, 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992) ("Until [the] defendant eventually submitted
to the officer's show of authority by stopping his vehicle, there was no seizure of
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In Florida v. Bostick,1° the United States Supreme Court held that
the Florida Supreme Court erred in adopting a per se rule that police
encounters with bus passengers were seizures." The test relied upon by
the majority to determine whether a police/citizen encounter was a seizure
was not a new one. 2 The Court, however, did explain this test somewhat.
It explained that when the police encounter a person seated on a bus
about to depart, that person has no desire to leave and would not feel
free to leave even if the police were not present. Accordingly, a court
should not focus on the "free to leave" language found in some earlier
opinions. Instead, the court should focus on whether the reasonable
person would feel that he could decline the requests of the officer or
otherwise terminate the encounter." If there is any true innovation in
the case, it is the adoption of the position advanced by Justice Blackmun,
dissenting in Florida v. Royer.54 In that case, Justice Blackmun suggested
that the "reasonable person" test presumes an innocent person." The
majority in Bostick adopted that position. 56
defendant .... ); State v. Williams, 596 So. 2d 399, 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992)
("Under Hodari D., these items were discarded before the defendant was 'seized' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); State v. Riley, 591 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1991) (it is only when a person is stopped without reasonable cause that the right
to be left alone is violated); State v. Ganier, 591 So. 2d 1328 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991)
(even if the Louisiana Constitution provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment
as interpreted in Hodari D., under the facts of the case, the police had sufficient
justification to pursue defendant); State v. Gray, 589 So. 2d 1135 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1991), writ denied, 594 So. 2d 1315 (1992) (upon encountering police, defendants fled
and discarded contraband while fleeing; therefore, under Hodari D. the contraband was
properly seized); State v. Pittman, 585 So. 2d 591, 595 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
586 So. 2d 545 (1991) ("If the appearance of the [police] vehicles could be construed to
be a legal show of authority, the defendant did not submit. Thus, we find there was no
investigatory stop and no illegal seizure of the defendant"); and State v. Morales, 583
So. 2d 129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (absent any evidence that the police exhibited physical
force or that defendant submitted to the show of authority there is no basis for a
defendant to complain).
50. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
51. Id. at 2385-88.
52. The test employed by the Court was whether, taking into account all of the
circumstances surrounding the encounter, reasonable persons would feel that they had lost
their ability to end the encounter, with the fact that the encounter took place on a bus
being only one of the factors in this inquiry. Id. at 2386-88.
53. Id. The Court found the case analytically indistinguishable from INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). The Court concluded that, just as for the workers
in Delgado, the relevant inquiry for a bus passenger is whether the passenger had reason
to believe that if he answered truthfully or refused to answer he would be subject to
further detention. Bostick, III S. Ct. at 2387.
54. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
55. Id. at 519 n.4, 103 S. Ct. at 1335 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. Bostick, Il1 S. Ct. at 2388.
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In State v. Williams,57 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that during
the course of a routine traffic stop, it is not permissible under Louisiana
law to require a passenger to disembark unless the officer has articulable
facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of danger from the passenger.
In State v. Landry," just as in Williams, the defendant was a passenger
in an automobile stopped for a routine traffic stop. This stop occurred
at 1:00 a.m. in New Orleans. The officer had no particular reason to
order the driver and passenger out of the car-it was simply "normal
safety procedure." 5 9 After ordering the passenger out of the car, the
officer requested and received identification from him. Upon discovering
that an outstanding warrant existed for the passenger's arrest, the officer
arrested him and conducted a search incident to that arrest. It was
during this search that the contraband at issue in the passenger's trial
was discovered. After having "granted certiorari to consider the appli-
cability and continued viability of the Williams decision,"0 the court
overruled Williams, "to the extent that it conflicts with this decision.' '61
Except for the fact that in Williams the time was 9:25 p.m. rather
than 1:00 a.m. as it was in Landry, there are no factual distinctions
between the two cases. Therefore, unless the court is implying that it
is less reasonable (and therefore in violation of the Louisiana Consti-
tution) to require a passenger to disembark at 9:25 in the evening than
it is at 1:00 a.m., 62 the limitations of Landry's impact on Williams are
illusory. For this reason, it appears that the comment that Williams is
overruled only "to the extent it conflicts" with Landry is without effect
and that Williams is overruled in its entirety. 63
In Gerstein v. Pugh,64 the Supreme Court held that a defendant
may not be subjected to extended pretrial deprivation of his liberty
interests without a prompt independent determination of probable cause
57. 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978), overruled by State v. Landry, 588 So. 2d 345 (La.
1991).
58. 588 So. 2d 345 (La. 1991).
59. Id. at 345.
60. Id. at 346.
61. Id. at 347.
62. There is no indication in the court's opinion that the order to disembark was
based either in actual or perceived danger to the officer, so the difference in time between
the two occurrences appears irrelevant.
63. The court's discussion about the propriety of requiring the defendant to disembark
from the car was dicta. Landry, 588 So. 2d at 347. The true issue in the case turned
on whether the acquisition of the identification from the defendant was proper. As the
officer might have obtained this identification whether or not he had requested the
defendant to disembark, id. at 347-48, the resolution of that issue was not necessary for
the court's opinion. Of course, since the court did go out of its way to discuss the
continued viability of Williams, those statements, as a practical matter, will guide decisions
in the future.
64. 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
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to believe that he is guilty of an offense. 65 In County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin," the respondents argued that Gerstein required that if the
determination were made post-arrest, it had to be made immediately
upon completion of the necessary administrative booking procedures.
The Court rejected this argument. 67 At the same time, the Court rejected
the County's argument that its procedures which called for an appear-
ance, with a concurrent determination of probable cause, within forty-
eight hours exclusive of holidays and weekends satisfied constitutional
mandate. 6 The Court held that in order to satisfy Gerstein's requirement
of a "prompt" probable cause determination after a warrantless arrest,
the government must determine probable cause as soon as is reasonably
feasible, but in no event later than forty-eight hours after arrest. 69 If
the determination is made within forty-eight hours, it is presumptively
reasonable; if it takes longer than forty-eight hours, the determination
is presumptively unreasonable. An intervening weekend is not sufficient
justification to extend the forty-eight hours.70
The Court rejected the County's argument that the fact it combines
other pretrial proceedings with the probable cause determination should
extend the forty-eight hour limit.7 ' It should be noted that the County
practice in McLaughlin was very similar to that authorized by Louisiana
65. This independent determination may come either before the arrest (by way of
indictment or arrest warrant) or promptly after the arrest. Id. at 125, 95 S. Ct. at 868-
69.
66. 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
67. The Court stated: "Inherent in Gerstein's invitation to the States to experiment
and adapt was the recognition that the Fourth Amendment does not compel an immediate
determination of probable cause upon completing the administrative steps incident to
arrest." Id. at 1668.
68. Id. at 1670.
69. Id.
70. Id. A hearing within forty-eight hours may violate Gerstein if the arrested in-
dividual can prove that the determination was delayed unreasonably. Where an arrested
individual does not receive a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours, the
burden of proof shifts to the government to demonstrate circumstances that justify the
delay. The Court stated:
Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional
evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested
individual, or delay for delay's sake. In evaluating whether the delay in a
particular case is unreasonable, however, courts must allow a substantial degree
of flexibility. Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting
arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where
no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer
who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an
arrest, and other practical realities.
Id.
71. Id.
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Code of Criminal Procedure article 230.1 .72 To the extent that the
probable cause determination awaits the initial appearance provided un-
der this provision, a defendant's rights under Gerstein would be-pre-
sumptively violated if the initial appearance does not occur within forty-
eight hours of the arrest. Of course, to the extent that a determination
of probable cause had been made prior to the arrest or a post-arrest
ex parte probable cause determination is timely made, the delay in the
initial appearance would not implicate Gerstein. For that reason, the
legislature by Acts 1992, No. 674, § 1 added Article 230.2 to the Code.
That article provides for an ex parte probable cause determination within
forty-eight hours of a non-warrant arrest.
B. Searches of Persons and Things
In California v. Acevedo, 73 the United States Supreme Court revisited
the troublesome issue of searching containers during a search pursuant
to the automobile exception. In Arkansas v. Sanders,74 the Court had
held that where the police have probable cause to search a container
in the car, the container could not be searched pursuant to the automobile
exception. The container could, however, be seized and then searched
but only if a warrant were obtained. 7 In United States v. Ross, 76 the
Supreme Court expanded the permissible scope of a search under the
automobile exception. It held that if the police have probable cause to
search the automobile, they may search the containers therein. 7 The
Court specifically provided, however, that Sanders survived this expan-
sion. It stated, "Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in
Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case .... "78
This reservation of the Sanders holding created the anomaly that
the more information the police had, the less they could search. For
example, if the police had only generalized probable cause to believe
that the object of the search could be found somewhere in the car,
they could search the entire car and all containers. 79 While at the same
time, if the police knew precisely in which container the object of the
72. According to that provision, an initial appearance, variously referred to as an
arraignment in other jurisdictions (including the one in question in McLaughlin), is to be
held "promptly" but in no event more than seventy-two hours after the arrest excluding
weekends and legal holidays.
73. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
74. 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979).
75. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977) (police could
seize but not search without a warrant a locked footlocker found in the trunk of a car).
76. 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
77. Id. at 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2173.
78. Id. at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
79. Id. The Court was careful to point out that this right to search was not limited
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search could be found, they were precluded from opening it.s0 This
distinction was not logicala' In order to address this anomaly, the Court
in Acevedo chose to overrule Sanders (and implicitly did the same as
to Chadwick).8 2 Accordingly, if the police have probable cause to search
the entire automobile or probable cause that is specific to a container
within the automobile, the container(s) may be searched. If the probable
cause is limited to a single container, then only that container may be
searched, not the entire automobile. s3
In State v. Bradys4 the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the
prosecution's claim that the search involved in that case was proper
without a warrant under the "murder scene" exception. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reviewed the prior jurisprudence on this alleged exception.
The court found that prior to Mincey v. Arizona,85 generally accepted
practice was to validate a warrantless search "when there were compelling
reasons for the immediate investigation of the scene of a possible
murder."8 s6 The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the search in Mincey
was invalidated by the United States Supreme Court but concluded that
or defined by the nature of the container. It stated: "One point on which the Court was
in virtually unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional distinction between
'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper." Id. at 822, 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
80. Id. at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
81. That is not to say that Ross was correct and Sanders incorrect-only that the
two cases were inconsistent.
82. California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991).
83. The Court stated, "'Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the
trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire
cab.' We reaffirm that principle." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting from Ross, 456 U.S.
at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2172).
For Louisiana cases in accord with Acevedo, see State v. Harmon, 594 So. 2d 1054
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (although police knew evidence was in the bag, bag was properly
seized and searched and need not have been held until a warrant could be obtained); and
State v. Wells, 593 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992) (recognition of theoretical
distinctions between forms of warrantless automobile searches are no longer justified).
84. 585 So. 2d 524 (La. 1991). Brady is interesting because it expands the Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), "fair probability" test for probable cause
to a non-warrant context. In Gates, the United States Supreme Court also provided that
when a warrant had been issued, the reviewing court is not to reassess probable cause
de novo. It is instead merely to review the fact to determine whether there was a substantial
basis for the issuing magistrate's decision that there was a fair probability of probable
cause. Id. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331. The Louisiana court in Brady did not address
whether the same deference provided in Gates to an issuing magistrate would be given
to an officer's determination of probable cause. However, to the extent that courts want
to encourage searches pursuant to warrants rather than warrantless searches, see Mas-
sachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1984), it would appear
inappropriate for a court reviewing the probable cause decision of a police officer to use
the same deferential standard. If that were done, much of the incentive to obtain the
warrant would be lost.
85. 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978).
86. Brady, 585 So. 2d at 527.
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the invalidation was based on the facts of that case.87 According to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, one of the pre-Mincey exceptions to the
warrant requirement was where
there were compelling reasons for the immediate investigation
of the scene of a possible murder. When the initial entry of
the police was legal and there were exigent circumstances such
as the fleeing of the unknown assailant, the need for immediately
developing possible identification evidence was deemed to justify
warrantless action.88
Finding that this exception was still alive and well after Mincey, the
court concluded that the warrantless search under the facts of this case
was valid. It distinguished Mincey and Thompson v. Louisiana89 in the
following manner:
' The present case is vastly different from Mincey and Thomp-
son. In Mincey and Thompson the circumstances of the killing
and the identity of the perpetrator were known before the search
was conducted; in the present case the police knew a stabbing
with some instrument had occurred somewhere, but knew nothing
of the identity of the assailant. In Mincey and Thompson no
occupant of the premises called the police, requested or partic-
ipated in the investigation, or acted in any manner that dem-
onstrated the occupant's diminished expectation of privacy in
the premises; in the present case a co-occupant (defendant) had
her neighbor summon the police, admitted the police into the
apartment herself, disclaimed any culpability, and tacitly man-
ifested an interest in the officers' conducting an investigation,
thereby significantly indicating that her expectation of privacy
was yielding to her interest in apprehending the killer of her
boyfriend.9°
87. The court stated:
The Court held that "the warrantless search of Mincey's apartment was not
constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred
there." [Mincey, 437 U.S.] at 395, 98 S. Ct. at 2415. Thus the Court refused
to recognize a general murder scene exception to the warrant requirement, but
noted that the state court could determine on remand whether any evidence was
permissibly seized under established Fourth Amendment standards.
Brady, 585 So. 2d at 527.
88. Id.
89. 469 U.S. 17, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984). In Thompson, the police found the defendant
at the scene of a murder. They removed the defendant, who was unconscious, from the
premises to the hospital. Thirty-five minutes later, homicide detectives arrived and con-
ducted a two-hour search of the premises. The Supreme Court held that the evidence
obtained during this search was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
18-23, 105 S. Ct. at 410-12.
90. Brady, 585 So. 2d at 528-29 (footnote omitted).
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Although these are distinctions between Brady and Mincey and Thomp-
son, these distinctions do not really go to the recognized exception to
which the Louisiana court ascribes its analysis in Brady-the exigency
exception. Without more of a demonstration that there was a likelihood
that the evidence would be destroyed or that the officers or public were
in danger, there is no exigency that requires the search be made without
the delay of obtaining a warrant. Justice Dennis, in dissent, pointed
this out. He reasoned:
The burden is on the government to show that the search falls
within one of the exceptional situations.
A justifiable warrantless search to prevent the destruction of
evidence is a subcategory of the exigent circumstances excep-
tion....
The Supreme Court has concluded that the need to prevent
destruction of evidence is one type of exigent circumstance that
may justify warrantless action but has not clearly defined at
what point the fear that evidence might be destroyed becomes
sufficient to justify warrantless action. The Court has never
approved a warrantless entry into private premises on this basis,
although it has suggested that evidence "in the process of de-
struction," Vale v. Louisiana, supra or "threatened with de-
struction," Johnson v. United States, supra, might justify such
action.
[A]ssuming for the sake of argument, that the officer
had probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity
was located on the premises, he necessarily would have had
probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed there
and that Brady had committed the offenses, since she was the
.only person known to be in the residence with the victim when
he died. Consequently, under such an assumption, the officer
would have had probable cause to arrest her, place her in custody
and remove her from the premises, thereby eliminating any
possibility that the evidence would be destroyed before a warrant
could be obtained. 9'
91. Id. at 531-33 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In defense of the majority
opinion, it should be noted that the need to prevent destruction of evidence is merely
one of the bases for the exigent circumstances exception recognized by the United States
Supreme Court (as recognized by Justice Dennis, id. at 531). See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978) (search to discover cause of fire when search was
a continuation of prior lawful entry does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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C. Consent to Searches
In Florida v. Jimeno,92 the officer heard what he believed to be the
defendant arranging a drug transaction over a public telephone. Since
the officer believed that the defendant might be involved in illegal drug
trafficking, the officer followed the defendant. When the defendant
made a right turn on red without stopping, the officer pulled him over.
The officer advised the defendant that he had been stopped for a traffic
violation and that the officer suspected defendant of drug trafficking. 9
Upon request that the officer be allowed to search the car for drugs,
the defendant gave the officer consent. Narcotics were found in a folded
paper bag on the car's floorboard. The defendant had not expressly
consented to the search of the bag, nor had he expressly limited the
search.94 The Supreme Court did not specifically address the issue of
whether the consent given by the defendant was actual consent to open
the bag. Instead, the Court chose to address the issue of the propriety
of the search even if the bag were not intended by the defendant to
be within the scope of the consent given. 91 It held that the Fourth
Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively
reasonable for the police to believe that the scope of the suspect's
consent permitted them to search in the area (or container) actually
searched.9 6
Under the facts of the case, the Court found that the officer's
authority to search the automobile extended beyond the car's interior
surfaces and permitted the officer to open containers large enough to
hold the object declared by the officer to be the object of the search. 7
The rationale employed by the Court was consistent with its earlier
92. 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991).
93. Id. at 1803. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions addressed the issue of
the potential pretextual nature of the stop. The issue of whether an officer may validly
seize a person when the officer has a justification unrelated to his actual motivation is
one that is ripe for determination by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Causey,
835 F.2d 1527 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding en banc that pretext is irrelevant so long as officer
had authority pursuant to warrant to make stop); Missouri v. Blair, 480 U.S. 698, 107
S. Ct. 1596 (1987) (writ granted to consider pretext issue dismissed as improvidently
granted).
94. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803-04.
95. Id. at 1804.
96. Id. Cf. United States v. Springs, 936 F.2d i330 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Springs,
the court found that a bus passenger's consent to a search of her tote bag extended to
a search of a closed container found within that bag. The passenger was explicitly advised
by a government agent that he was looking for narcotics, and the closed container was
not an unlikely storage place for narcotics. See also State v. Brady, 585 So. 2d 524 (La.
1991) (search of linen closet was within the tacit consent to search the house where victim
had been stabbed to death).
97. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
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ruling in Illinois v. Rodriguez.9 In Rodriguez the Court held that even
if the person giving an officer permission to conduct a search did not
have actual authority to do so, the search was reasonable so long as
the 6fficer in objective good faith believed that the putative consenter
had such authority. 99
The import of the Court's holding in Jimeno is clearly limited to
circumstances where the officer is objectively reasonable in his belief
that the defendant's consent authorized the search in question. For that
reason, the Court found it significant that the officer had declared the
object of the search prior to the consent.100 Once the officer knew that
the defendant knew the object of the search, the Court concluded that
the officer could reasonably believe the defendant was consenting to not
only a search of the car itself but also any container readily accessible
within the car which might hold the object of the search.' 0' The Court
also pointed out that since such a search is justified by the defendant's
consent (or the officer's objective reliance thereon), the defendant has
the power to define the scope of that consent and may limit the search
to the interior surfaces of the car. 102
III. CorFEssioNs
The defendant in McNeil v. Wisconsin103 requested the right to
counsel during a judicial proceeding arising out of an armed robbery
charge. While he was still in custody on this charge, he was questioned
about an unrelated murder charge. Although before this questioning the
defendant waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,t°4 he contended
that the waiver was invalid.10 The basis of the defendant's argument
was that under Edwards v. Arizona,1'1 Arizona v. Roberson,"" and
98. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
.99. Id. at 2798-2800.
100. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
101. Id. The Supreme Court cited with apparent approval and distinguished the case
of State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989). In Wells, the Florida Supreme Court held
that police officers exceeded the scope of consent when they searched a locked briefcase
found in the trunk of a car during a search pursuant to consent to search the car. Id.
at 467.
102. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804. Of course, should the officer have probable cause
to search the automobile, he may do so without a warrant under the automobile exception,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), and the automobile emergency
exception under Louisiana law, State v. Guzman, 362 So. 2d 744 (La. 1978). This then
allows the officer to search containers, possibly even locked ones, within the car. See
discussion supra at notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
103. 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
104. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
105. McNeil, Ill S. Ct. at 2206-07.
106. 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981).
107. 486 U.S. 675, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).
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Michigan v. Jackson,'0 ° the Miranda waiver was ineffective because it
came pursuant to police-initiated conduct after the request for counsel.' °9
The Supreme Court rejected the claim, limiting the cited cases to their
facts. It held instead that a defendant's invocation of his Sixth Aiflend-
ment right to counsel at his appearance on a charged offense was not
an invocation of his right to counsel as to a separate uncharged offense.
Accordingly, the Court found that the invocation in the instant case
did not preclude police interrogation about an unrelated offense, as to
which the defendant had waived his Miranda rights.110
IV. CRIMINAL TRIAL. PROCEDURE
A. Harmless Error
In a split opinion in Arizona v. Fulminante,"' a five-member ma-
jority held that the admission of a coerced confession into a criminal
defendant's trial is subject to the harmless error analysis. In reaching
this conclusion, the majority distinguished trial errors from structural
defects."12 It noted that a trial error occurs during the presentation of
the case to the trier of fact and may be assessed in the context of the
other evidence to determine whether its admission at trial is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." 3 The Court defined structural defects as
those which infect the trial mechanism and cannot be analyzed under
a harmless error standard because the entire conduct of a trial is affected
by the rror." 4
108. 475 U.S. 625, 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986).
109. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2207 (1991). Edwards held that after the
defendant has invoked his Miranda right to counsel, any subsequent waiver of that right
pursuant to police initiated conduct would be ineffective. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85,
101 S. Ct. at 1884-85. Roberson expanded Edwards to a situation where different officers
questioned the defendant about a different offense. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678, 108 S.
Ct. at 2096. Jackson held that the defendant's invocation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel at a judicial proceeding precluded the subsequent waiver of that right pursuant
to police initiated conduct. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636, 106 S. Ct. at 1411.
110. McNeil, 111 S. Ct. at 2210. Since the Court found that the two offenses were
unrelated, it did not address the result if the offenses had been related. Nor, under the
facts of the case, was it necessary for the Court to do any substantial analysis of when
two offenses are related.
111. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
112. Id. at 1254-55.
113. Id. at 1264.
114. Id. at 1265. The structural defects listed by the Court included the complete
denial of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963); deprivation
of the right to self-representation at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.
Ct. 944 (1984); adjudication by a biased judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct.
437 (1927); denial of the right to a public trial, Walker v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.
Ct. 2210 (1984); and unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand
jury, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986). Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
at 1256.
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The Court in Fulminante must be commended for attempting to
add some measure of predictability to the issue of when the harmless
error analysis would be applicable.' What started out as a doctrine to
be applied in a limited set of circumstances" 6 has become the rule rather
than the exception." ' During the course of this transformation, the
Supreme Court had given little guidance as to when the doctrine is
applicable and when it is not. Instead, the Court had chosen merely to
either apply the doctrine"' or to not apply it" 9 on a case by case basis. 2 0
One of the first opportunities for the Louisiana Supreme Court to
consider the Fulminante dichotomy arose in State v. Cage.' In that
case, the jury had been erroneously instructed on the definition of the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden. The Louisiana Supreme Court
applied the "trial error" and "structural defect" dichotomy to conclude
that a jury charge that erroneously instructed the jury on the definition
115. See Simien, supra note 45, at 77-78.
116. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). In providing that
the harmless error analysis is applicable to some federal constitutional violations, the
Court stated: "We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent
with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal
of the conviction." Id. at 22, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
117. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1254-55 (1991).
118. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
119. See cases cited supra at note 114. At other times the Supreme Court has merely
raised questions about the propriety of using a harmless error analysis in a particular
case. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 304, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1121 (1981).
120. Although commendation for the Court's effort at establishing some predictability
is in order, that is not the same as saying that the means chosen was the proper one.
Other options were available. For example, the jury serves at least a dual function in
our criminal justice system-that of fact finder and that of the role of the conscience of
society in a given case. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136-37 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). In light of this dual function, another dichotomy for determining the appropriate
role of harmless error is suggested. In reviewing the evidence presented to the jury, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an appellate court to determine the
impact of an error that affects the ability of that jury to act as society's conscience (i.e.,
one that prejudices the jury against the defendant). It would be much less difficult to
review the facts and determine how an error affected the jury's fact finding function.
Accordingly, a better dichotomy might be one that divided errors along this basis and
applied a harmless error analysis to errors where the reviewing court found that only the
fact finding function was affected and not to those that might bias the jury against the
defendant. Cf. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S. Ct. at 1436 (explaining the Court's
reasoning in Chapman of excusing errors that were 'harmless' in terms of their effect
on the fact finding process of the trial").
This survey of recent developments is not the appropriate vehicle to conduct an in
depth analysis of other available options or even a complete discussion of the pros and
cons of this option, reference to which should not be construed as a recommendation
thereof. This option has been listed as merely one of the possible alternatives.
121. 583 So. 2d 1125 (La.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 211 (1991).
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of reasonable doubt was a trial error. The court reached this result
because the instruction "was given by the trial judge ... during the
guilt phase of defendant's trial [and] [u]nder the distinction drawn by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Fulminante between trial errors and structural
defects in the trial mechanism, the instruction is a trial error."12 2 After
the court in Cage concluded that the harmless error analysis was ap-
propriate, the court found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
122. Id. at 1127. Cage must be compared to the same court's per curiam opinion in
State v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 1211 (La. 1991). Over the objection of trial counsel, the
defendant in Brown was presented before the jury in prison clothing. The defendant had
been wearing "street clothes" when he was being transported to the trial. A sheriff deputy
instructed the defendant to wear the prison garb to trial. In addition, the defendant's
request for leave to change back into his "street clothes" was denied. Id. at 1212. The
trial court admonished the jury that:
Ladies and gentlemen, you will notice that the defendant is in his parish prison
garb, which indicates to you that he is in parish prison. That's not to play any
part whatsoever if you are chosen as a juror. The only thing that that means
is that he could not afford to make bond. Many people are on the street when
they commit a crime, and they make bond. Some people can't afford it, so
they're in jail. It does not play any part whatsoever with ... you inasfar as
innocence or guilt is concerned.
Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held, citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.
Ct. 1691 (1976), that forcing the defendant to appear before the jury in prison garb
violated his due process rights. Brown, 585 So. 2d at 1212-13. In addressing the issue of
harmless error, the court held that the harmless error doctrine could not be applied. The
court reasoned that:
"[Tihe constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive,
identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment ..." and create an "unac-
ceptable risk ... of impermissible factors coming into play." The error so
affects "[tihe entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end," that we find
no circumstances in this case which would justify holding such a pervasive and
inherently prejudicial practice harmless to the defendant's right to an impartial
verdict from the jury he selected.
Brown, 585 So. 2d at 1213 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Some of these statements might be read as applying the harmless error analysis and
having simply concluded that the error was harmful. However, the court's references to
Fulminante, the clothes as a "constant reminder," and the effect on "the entire conduct
of the trial," id., indicate that what the court was, in fact, holding was that this was a
structural defect not amenable to the harmless error analysis. See Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
at 1254-66.
Although not articulated by the court in Brown, what may have been just as significant
in the facts of that case was the admonition given to the jury. In the admonition, the
judge only made passing comments to the fact that the garb was to have no effect on
the deliberations. Otherwise, however, the admonition merely implied that street clothing
was no indication of innocence but only affluence. For example, the instruction indicated
that "[mI]any people are on the street when they commit a crime." The sentence was
followed by another that said: "Some people can't afford it [bond]." The judge made
no direct comment about the fact that a person who is innocent may be in jail. Brown,
585 So. 2d at 1212.
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"[blecause of the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's
guilt .... ''123
Justice Dennis argued strenuously in dissent that this erroneous jury
charge was a structural defect.' u Among other things, Justice Dennis
found that the giving of this charge was indistinguishable from the dicta
found in cases as late as Rose v. Clark.' In Rose, the United States
Supreme Court applied a harmless error analysis to a mandatory pre-
sumption jury charge that was held to be unconstitutional under the
Court's earlier pronouncement in Sandstrom v. Montana. 26 Justice Den-
nis pointed out, however, that the Court in Clark
expressly declared that the erroneous presumption of malice
instruction [is to be distinguished] . . . from "'other instructional
errors that prevent a jury from considering an issue' . . . . Cf.
Jackson v. Virginia, (suggesting that failure to instruct a jury
as to the reasonable doubt standard cannot be harmless)." Rose
v. Clark, 478 U.S. at 580, n. 8, 106 S. Ct. at 3107, n. 8, citing
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 95, n. 3, 103 S. Ct. at
982, n. 3 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).' 7
Justice Dennis further pointed out that the majority opinion in Rose v.
Clark made it clear that "'other instructional errors' which would prevent
a jury from considering any issue on the merits such as 'a failure to
instruct a jury as to reasonable-doubt standard' could not be harmless
or subject to the Chapman standard."'2 Although Justice Dennis does
not take the next step in his argument, one might reasonably conclude
that the rationale of the Rose v. Clark dicta applies a fortiori to an
erroneous reasonable doubt charge that lessens the State's burden. 29 Not
only is the jury not advised of the obligation to put the State's evidence
123. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1128. For a similar approach to the application of the
harmless error analysis see United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S. Ct. 725 (1986).
In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The [harmless error] inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to
support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even
so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in
grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand."
Id. at 449, 106 S. Ct. at 732 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765,
66 S. Ct. 1239, 1248 (1946)). In determining whether such an influence might exist, the
Court looked to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at 450, 106 S. Ct. at 732.
124. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1135.
125. 478 U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
126. 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979).
127. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1133 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1134 (quoting Clark, 442 U.S. at 580 n.8, 106 S. Ct. at 3107 n.8).
129. The United States Supreme Court had already concluded that the charge given
in Cage had the effect of lessening the State's burden of proof. Cage v. Louisiana, 498
U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990).
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to the beyond a reasonable doubt test, but the jury is actually told that
the level of proof is something less than it actually is. Since the jury
is presumed to follow its instructions, 30 it is presumed that the jury
applied this improper, lower burden. At least if the jury were not
instructed at all on the standard, one might conclude that the informal
educational process had advised the jurors of the State's burden in a
criminal case, which presumably, without the improper instruction, would
have been properly applied.
At the time of the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Cage,
the court was not privy to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Yates v. Evatt,'31 which was rendered twenty-two days later. The
United States Supreme Court found that an erroneous jury instruction
on the presumption of malice in a prosecution for accomplice murder
could not be excused as harmless error under Chapman.'3 2 The state
supreme court in Yates had concluded that the instructions established
an unconstitutional presumption, but held that the error was harmless
because there was sufficient evidence of malice such that the jury did
not have to rely on the presumption. The United States Supreme Court
disagreed. Although it agreed that the harmless error analysis was ap-
plicable, the Court disagreed with the state court's application.'3 3
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, held that in the context of
an erroneous presumption, the application of the harmless error doctrine
is a two-step process.1 14 First, the reviewing court must determine what
evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict., Justice
Souter wrote:
Thus, to say that an instruction to apply an unconstitutional
presumption did not contribute to the verdict is to make a
judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable
jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by
those jurors independently of the presumption.
Before reaching such a judgment, a court must take two quite
distinct steps. First, it must ask what evidence the jury actually
considered in reaching its verdict .... In answering this question,
a court does not conduct a subjective enquiry into the jurors'
minds. The answer must come, instead, from analysis of the
130. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (1987).
131. 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991).
132. Id. at 1895-97. "[Tlhe judge instructed the jury ... that 'malice [which is an
element of the offense] is implied or presumed' from either the 'willful, deliberate, and
intentional doing of an unlawful act' or from the 'use of a deadly weapon."' Id. at
1886.
133. Id. at 1891.
134. Id. at 1893.
135. Id.
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instructions given to the jurors and from application of that
customary presumption that jurors follow instructions and, spe-
cifically, that they consider relevant evidence on a point in issue
when they are told they may do so.
... [The] assumption [that the harmless error analysis requires
a review of the entire record] is simply [based on the notion]
that the jury considered all the evidence bearing on the issue
in question before it made the findings on which the verdict
rested. If, on the contrary, that assumption were incorrect, an
examination of the entire record would not permit any sound
conclusion to be drawn about the significance of the error to
the jury in reaching the verdict. This point must always be kept
in mind when reviewing erroneous presumptions for harmless
error, because the terms of some presumptions so narrow the
jury's focus so as to leave it questionable that a reasonable
juror would look to anything but the evidence establishing the
predicate fact in order to infer the fact presumed. When applying
a harmless-error analysis in presumption cases, therefore, it is
crucial to ascertain from the trial court's instructions that the
jurors, as reasonable persons, would have considered the entire
trial record, before looking to that record to assess the signif-
icance of the erroneous presumption.'36
After the reviewing court determines what evidence the jury actually
considered, it must then weigh the probative force of that evidence
against the probative force of the presumption standing alone.137 It is
not enough that the jury considered evidence from which it could have
reached the verdict without reliance on the presumption. The Supreme
Court held that the reviewing court must be convinced beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the presumptions did not contribute to the jury's
finding on the presumed fact.'38
136. Id. at 1893-94 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Yates' requirement that the
reviewing court only consider that evidence actually considered by the jury seems at odds
with the Louisiana Supreme Court's analysis in Cage. To the extent that only the evidence
actually considered by the jury can form the basis of the harmless error analysis, it would
appear that only the evidence considered by the jury under the appropriate standard may
be considered. Since the erroneous instruction in Cage affected the jury's assessment of
the entire evidence, there is no evidence actually considered by the jury (under the
appropriate standard) which the reviewing court may rely upon in making its harmless
error determination. Certiorari has been granted by the United States Sureme Court in
a case where it may have to decide whether the harmless error analysis is applicable to
a misdefinition of reasonable doubt. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992).
137. Id. at 1893.
138. Id. at 1893-94. The Supreme Court found that the specific circumstances of the
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In determining the effect of a federal constitutional violation, state
courts must apply the federal harmless error analysis.' 39 When the vi-
olation is based in state law, however, state courts are free to fashion
the remedy of their choice, including automatic reversal if they so
choose.' 40 For this reason, Justice Dennis in dissent to the Cage opinion
invited the majority to reconsider whether the Cage instruction violated
state as well as federal law.' 4' If so, Justice Dennis argued, then the
harmless error analysis would differ. First, he argued that under state
law, harmless error should not apply at all to this type of violation.' 42
Second, Justice Dennis argued that if harmless error were applicable
under state law, the application of the doctrine would differ.' 43
There is support for Justice Dennis' argument in Louisiana juris-
prudence. In State v. Gibson,'44 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the harmless error analysis under Louisiana law would not focus on the
strength of the case (or overwhelming weight of the evidence). It instead
indicated that the focus would be on the potential for prejudice inherent
in the error. "'4 The court reasoned that since the Louisiana Constitution
extends appellate jurisdiction only to questions of law in criminal
matters,' 46 review for overwhelming weight of the evidence was not a
permissible approach under state law.' 47 It instead found that the ap-
proach utilized in Chapman v. California'" was more consistent with
the limits on appellate jurisdiction.' 49 The Gibson court concluded that
such an approach is less intrusive on the jury's function than the
overwhelming evidence test and would require a Louisiana appellate
court to conduct a more limited review of fact. Therefore, the review
victim's death did not so convincingly indicate the principal's malice in killing her that
it could be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors rested a finding of malice on
that evidence exclusive of the presumptions. Id. at 1897.
139. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 13, 21, 87 S. Ct. 824, 826-27 (1967).
140. Id., 87 S. Ct. at 826.
141. State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125, 1137 (La.) (Dennis, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 211 (1991).
142. Id. at 1137-38 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1138-39 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
144. 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
145. Id. at 427.
146. See La. Const. art. V, § 5(C).
147. Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 426-27. Of course, to the extent a state appellate court
finds that there was a violation of a right based solely in federal law, the Supremacy
Clause requires application of the federal harmless error analysis. See supra text accom-
panying note 139. Accordingly, despite the state constitutional limits on appellate review
of facts, the state appellate court would have to review facts to determine if the error
was harmless due to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
148. 386 U.S. 13, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (Court looked to the nature of the error).
149. Since Chapman, federal appellate courts have not only looked to the nature of
the error and the prejudice inherent in the error but also to the overwhelming weight of
the evidence. If a trial error is insignificant or if the evidence is overwhelming, the error
is considered harmless. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S. Ct. 725 (1986).
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would be more in accord with the limits on appellate review provided
in the Louisiana Constitution.10
B. Confrontation and Hearsay
In White v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court held that
the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the admission of testimony
under the spontaneous declaration'5 2 and medical examination exceptions
to the hearsay rule even if the prosecution does not produce the declarant
who was available.' The Court reasoned that these exceptions were
traditional hearsay exceptions, and since the Confrontation Clause and
the traditional hearsay exceptions were both designed to serve the same
purpose-to assure reliability-the admission of reliable evidence under
one of these exceptions would not violate the Confrontation Clause. ' 4
C. Forcible Medication at Trial
The Supreme Court rejected the state's arguments in Riggins v.
Nevada5 that it should be allowed to forcibly medicate the defendant
with antipsychotic medication during his trial. In that case, the defendant
had moved to suspend the administration of the medication until after
his trial. He argued that he had the right to show jurors his true mental
state when he offered an insanity defense. The Supreme Court held that
once the defendant made that motion, the burden was on the State to
establish both the need for the medication and its medical appropriate-
150. Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 427. As recently as June of this year, the Louisiana
Supreme Court was still citing Gibson. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992).
However, it is not clear whether that citation is an indication that the court still feels
that Louisiana law provides a different harmless error analysis. Hearold was written by
Justice Lemmon, who stated in Cage that the court had merely applied a standard to
which it had "consistently adhered." In support of this statement, Justice Lemmon cited
Gibson. State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (La.) (Lemmon, J., concurring) (citing
Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 421), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 211 (1991).
151. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
152. This exception under Illinois law corresponds, although not in name, to the
excited utterance exception under Louisiana law. See La. Code Evid. art. 803(2).
153. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742-43.
154. Id. at 743. The Court interestingly looked to the general presumption of reliability
of the hearsay exceptions. It did not look to the specifics of the case under which the
exception was applied. For example, in justifying the admission of the statements to a
medical provider, the Court noted that such "a statement made in the course of procuring
medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis
or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility .... ." Id. However, under the
facts of this case, it is highly unlikely that a four-year-old child (who made the statements)
would have actually thought of the ramifications of an untruthful statement to her doctor.
Accordingly, the reliability justification for the exception was not actually present.
155. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
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ness. 56 Although not shown in the instant case, the Supreme Court
indicated that if the medication were appropriate to maintain a psy-
chological balance needed to sustain the defendant's trial competence,
forced medication would be consistent with constitutional limitations. 57
Without such a showing and without the consideration of other alter-
natives to the medication, the Court concluded that even if expert
testimony would be sufficient to permit jurors to assess the defendant's
demeanor fairly, the unacceptable risk remained that forced medication
compromised the defendant's trial rights.'
D. Right to Trial By Jury
Probably the leading case on jury trial rights during the last decade
was Batson v. Kentucky. 159 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
a defendant of the same race as jurors intentionally excluded on the
basis of their race would have an equal protection claim sufficient to
set aside his conviction.' 60 Although the Batson holding was limited to
exclusion on the basis of race, it would appear that its reasoning should
have implications far beyond its narrow holding. This was implicitly
recognized by the Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New York.' 6' In that
156. Id. at 1815.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1816. The Court noted that the medications may have affected Riggins'
appearance before the jury (which is significant in a case of a plea of insanity) and his
ability to assist in his trial. Id. at 1811, 1813. The Court also noted that in balancing
the State's interest and Riggins' interest, the state courts should have considered Riggins'
liberty interest against forced medication. Id.
159. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
160. The defendant, of course, would not automatically prevail because a juror of a
certain race was excluded from the jury by the prosecutor. The defendant would also
have to demonstrate circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. at
96-97, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-23. Only then would the prosecution be called upon to dem-
onstrate race neutral reasons for the exclusion. If the prosecutor provided such reasons,
no equal protection violation would be found unless the defendant demonstrated that the
purported reasons were a guise for discriminatory interest. Id. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. at
1723-24.
As a practical consideration, however, if a Batson objection is made, judges might
consider requiring a race neutral explanation even before the inference of discrimination
is present. Otherwise, if the inference is later present, the allegedly improperly excluded
jurors would have already been excused. Even if the jurors were not excused (but asked
to remain some place in the courtroom), if the judge had not made a final ruling on
the Batson objection, he might have to reseat a juror that had already been removed
from the box or declare a mistrial and restart jury selection.
161. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). The lead opinion in this case was only a plurality of
four justices. However, Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and Justice Scalia, appeared
to agree with much of what the plurality wrote:
I agree with the plurality that we review for clear error the trial court's finding
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case, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor had intentionally excluded
prospective "Latino" jurors on the basis of their ethnicity. Without a
discussion of the difference, if any, between ethnic discrimination and
racial discrimination, the plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy
(and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Souter).
accepted the proposition that "[ijf true, the prosecutor's discriminatory
use of peremptory strikes [on the basis of ethnicity] would violate the
Equal Protection Clause as interpreted" in Batson.1
62
The plurality opinion then turned its attention to the requirement
that the prosecution provide a race-neutral explanation.1 61 It provided
that trial courts should review the prosecutor's explanation by a very
deferential standard.'" The Court also went on to hold that appellate
review of the trial court's conclusions on discriminatory intent should
as to discriminatory intent, and agree with its analysis of this issue. I agree
also that the finding of no discriminatory intent was not clearly erroneous in
this case. I write separately because I believe that the plurality opinion goes
farther than it needs to in assessing the constitutionality of the prosecutor's
asserted justification for his peremptory strikes.
Id. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At no point did Justice O'Connor disagree with
the application of Batson to a claim of ethnic discrimination. In light of this concurrence,
it would appear that much of the discussion in the plurality opinion would qualify as
an opinion by the Court.
Justice O'Connor's criticism of the plurality that a challenge must be explained at
the for-cause level does not appear well founded. Id. at 1875. The plurality specifically
stated that "[w]hile the reason offered by the prosecutor ... need not rise to the level
of a challenge for cause, the fact that it corresponds to a valid for-cause challenge will
demonstrate its race-neutral character." Id. at 1868 (citation omitted).
On the issue of the applicability of Batson beyond the context of race, see United
States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Batson's prohibition against
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges applies to striking potential jurors on the
basis of gender). But see United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d i038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990) (Batson inapplicable to peremptory
strikes on the basis of gender); and State v. Morgan, 553 So. 2d 1012 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 600 (La. 1990) (same).
162. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1864. The Court also noted that it was not attempting
to draw any distinction between the term Latino and Hispanic, which term had appeared
in amicus briefs and was used in the trial court. Id.
163. Id. at 1866. Since Batson applies beyond the context of racial discrimination,
"race-neutral" is really a misnomer. However, the Court in Hernandez continued to use
that term and, for the sake of convenience, I will continue to do so in this article.
164. The Court stated:
A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation
based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry,
the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a dis-
criminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered
will be deemed race neutral.
Id.
Once the prosecution has set forth a neutral reason for the strike, the defendant
might still prevail if he can otherwise prove purposeful discrimination. Id. at 1868.
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be by the "clearly erroneous" standard. 65 Employing this standard, the
Supreme Court found that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in
concluding that the prosecutor, who volunteered that he struck the
bilingual jurors because they hesitated before responding to his inquiry
as to whether they would accept a translator's version of the witnesses'
responses, provided neutral reasons for the strikes.'6
The plurality rejected the defendant's argument that because of the
close relationship to language and ethnicity this explanation should not
qualify as neutral. The plurality concluded that even if a high percentage
of bilingual jurors might hesitate before answering the question of
whether they would accept the interpreter's testimony, and thus be
excluded under the prosecutor's criterion, that fact did not cause the
criterion to fall the race-neutrality test. 67
In Powers v. Ohio,'6 a white male objected to the State's use of
peremptory challenges to remove blacks from the jury. His objections,
based on Batson, were overruled. Following his conviction, petitioner
appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeal which affirmed the conviction. ,69
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the Equal
Protection Clause, a criminal defendant may object to race-based ex-
clusions of jurors through peremptory challenges whether or not the
defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race.' 70 The Court
165. Id. at 1869. See also De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1442. The court applied the clearly
erroneous standard to a trial court's determination that an inference of gender discrim-
ination was present. At the time of the challenge, ten women and two men were seated
in the jury box, and only one man remained in the venire.
166. Hernandez, IIl S. Ct. at 1864-65.
167. Id. at 1867. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion went further to note that
Batson "does not require that the justification be unrelated to race. Batson requires only
that the prosecutor's reason for striking a juror not be the juror's race." Id. at 1875
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
169. Id. at 1366.
170. Id. at 1370. See also Trevino v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1547, 1548 (1992) (Hispanic
defendant may object to the racial discrimination of black jurors).
The Court in Trevino also addressed the issue of whether the defendant had adequately
raised the issue in the state court in order to seek relief before the Supreme Court. The
defendant's trial was held prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Batson. The defendant
filed a pre-trial "Motion to Prohibit the State From Using Peremptory Challenges to
Strike Members of a Cognizable Group." The defendant not only relied on a claim of
a historical pattern of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, but in his argument
to the trial court made an express reference to Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.
Ct. 824 (1965). Trevino, 112 S. Ct. at 1548. The defendant also preserved his equal
protection claim for the state appellate court by including an express reference in his
argument caption to the Fourteenth Amendment and by presenting for review the very
issue that he had raised before the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that the
claim had been sufficiently raised below. Id. at 1549. In so doing, the Court relied upon
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reasoned that the defendant had standing to assert the equal protection
claim of the excluded jurors.' 7'
During the prior term, the Court held in Holland v. Illinois,'72 under
identical factual allegations to those in Powers, that no cognizable claim
is made under the alleged Sixth Amendment fair cross-section theory.
The Court in Holland reasoned that as to the petit jury, the Sixth
Amendment's requirement of an "impartial jury" includes no fair cross-
section component. 73 The holding in Powers, in effect, made Holland
"dead letter." Except for the unwary, a defendant of a race different
than the excluded jurors will simply assert the excluded juror's equal
protection claim rather than his own Sixth Amendment claim. To the
extent that trial counsel fails to properly allege the objection, it would
appear that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim would lie. 74 If
the issue were presented as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
one interesting question that remains is whether the burden to dem-
onstrate that there were no race neutral reasons would fall upon the
defendant. 75 However, in light of the fact that transfer of this burden
to the defendant would require him to disprove a negative when all of
the facts to do so are in the control of the prosecution, it would not
appear appropriate to place the burden of effect of this error on the
defendant, as is normally done in cases alleging ineffective assistance.
its earlier ruling in Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850, 857-58 (1991), where it held under
similar facts that the failure of the defendant to raise an objection after the selection of
the jurors (except by way of motion for a new trial) was not a sufficient independent
state procedural bar to prevent review by the United States Supreme Court.
171. Powers, 11 S. Ct. at 1373. The Court found petitioner could assert "third party
standing" under the three part analysis of Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-16, 96
S. Ct. 2868, 2873-75 (1976): (1) the defendant received a cognizable injury and has a
concrete interest in challenging the practice, because racial discrimination in jury selection
casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process and places the fairness of the criminal
proceeding in doubt; (2) the relationship between the defendant and the excluded jurors
is such that the defendant is fully as effective a proponent of their rights as they themselves
would be, since both have a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from
the courtroom, and there can be no doubt that the defendant will be a motivated, effective
advocate because proof of a discriminatorily constituted jury may lead to the reversal of
the conviction; and (3) it is unlikely that a juror dismissed because of race will possess
sufficient incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his or her
own rights. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
172. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
173. Id. at 807.
174. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991 (5th
Cir. i979); State v. Wright, 598 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
175. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067 (1984)
(burden on defendant to prove effect of deficient performance of counsel).
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In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,1 76 the United States Supreme
Court was called to address the question of whether the action of a
private party in discriminatorily exercising peremptory challenges violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 177 The Court answered this question affirmatively. The analysis
employed by the majority, 78  and by Justice O'Connor in dissent, 7 9
raised questions about the applicability of Edmonson to a criminal
defendant's use of peremptory challenges. Justice Scalia disagreed, con-
cluding that the criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges was
176. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
177. The resolution of this issue was necessary because the Fourteenth Amendment is
implicated only if the offending conduct is that of a state actor. See Edmonson, 111 S.
Ct. at 2082 ("The Constitution's protection of individual liberty and equal protection
apply in general only to action by the government"). Cf. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S.
179, 109 S. Ct. 454, 461 (1988) (Due Process Clause only regulates state action and not
that of private parties no matter how unfair).
178. The majority stated:
We find respondent's reliance on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102
S. Ct. 445 (1981), unavailing. In that case, we held that a public defender is
not a state actor in his general representation of a criminal defendant, even
though he may be in his performance of other official duties. See id., at 325,
102 S. Ct. at 453-54; Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519, 100 S. Ct. 1287,
1295 (1980). While recognizing the employment relation between the public
defender and the government, we noted that the relation is otherwise adversarial
in nature. 454 U.S., at 323, n.13, 102 S. Ct., at 452, n. 13. "[A] defense
lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an
administrative superior. Held to the same standards of competence and integrity
as a private lawyer, . . . a public defender works under canons of professional
responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of
the client." Id., at 321, 102 S. Ct. at 451.
Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
179. Justice O'Connor, writing in dissent:
"[Ilt is the function of the public defender to enter 'not guilty' pleas, move
to suppress State's evidence, object to evidence at trial, cross-examine State's
witnesses, and make closing arguments in behalf of defendants. All of these
are adversarial functions. We find it peculiarly difficult to detect any color of
state law in such activities." 454 U.S., at 320, 102 S. Ct., at 451.
Our conclusion in Dodson was that "a public defender does not act under
color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel
to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Id., at 325, 102 S. Ct., at 453. It
cannot be gainsaid that a peremptory strike is a traditional adversarial act;
parties use these strikes to further their own perceived interests, not as an aid
to the government's process of jury selection ....
... At a minimum then, the Court must concede that Dodson stands for
the proposition that a criminal defense attorney is not a state actor when using
peremptory strikes on behalf of a client, nor is an attorney representing a private
litigant in a civil suit against the government.
Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2094 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
from Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981)).
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indistinguishable from that of a private party litigant found to be a
state actor in Edmonson.8 0 The Court granted certiorari in Georgia v.
McCollum8 ' to resolve this issue. In what might be interpreted to have
been a surprising result, the Court held that a criminal defendant's use
of peremptory challenges is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment.1
8 2
E. Double Jeopardy
In a federal court proceeding in Missouri, the defendant in United
States v. Felix'83 had been charged and convicted of attempting to
manufacture an illegal drug. That conviction was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 8 4 A subsequent federal prosecution was in-
stituted in Oklahoma. The defendant was charged with substantive drug
charges (independent of the activity in Missouri) and a drug conspiracy
charge. Two of the overt acts alleged in the conspiracy charge were the
same conduct for which the defendant had been prosecuted in Missouri. 5
At the trial in Oklahoma, the government "introduced much of the
same evidence of the Missouri and Oklahoma transactions that had been
introduced in the Missouri trial."' 86
Based on its reading of the earlier Supreme Court opinion in Grady
v. Corbin,8 7 a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the defendant's
conviction of six of the eight counts with which he was charged.'
Quoting from Grady, the Court of Appeals held that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution where the government, "'to
establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution,
180. See, e.g., the following statement: "In criminal cases, Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), already prevents the prosecution from using race-based
strikes. The effect of today's decision (which logically must apply to criminal prosecutions)
will be to prevent the defendant from doing so . . . ." Id. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
181. 112 S. Ct. 370 (1992). The Louisiana Supreme Court had also granted writs in
two consolidated cases to address the same issue. The only difference was that in McCollum
the defendant was white, allegedly striking jurors because they were black, and in Jackson
and Knox the defendants were black, allegedly striking jurors because they were white.
See State v. Knox consolidated with State v. Jackson, No. 91-KK-1906 (La. Nov. 30,
1992) (WL 355140). Following McCollum, the Louisiana Supreme Court held Batson
applicable. Id.
182. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354.
183. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
184. Id. at 1379.
185. Id. at 1380.
186. Id. at 1381.
187. 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
188. United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1377 (1992).
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will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant
has already been prosecuted." ' ' s9 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court first considered the dismissal of the substantive
charges because evidence of them had been introduced in the previous
Missouri trial.19° The Court found that the Court of Appeals had given
"an extravagant reading [to] Grady, which disclaimed any intention of
adopting a 'same evidence' test."' 9' As to the conspiracy charge dismissed
by the Court 'of Appeals, the Supreme Court held, relying on a long
line of precedent, that a substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit
that crime are not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes
even though based on the same underlying incidents. 92
In United States v. Miller,'93 the defendants were to be reprosecuted
on mail fraud charges after their original mail fraud convictions were
reversed, because the indictment and jury instructions did not require
the jury to find all the elements of the crime.19 Following the second
indictment, the defendants contended that reprosecution was barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the subsequent prosecution was not barred
by double jeopardy.19s In addition, the court rejected the defendants'
189. Id. at 1527 (quoting Grady, 495 U.S. 521, 110 S. Ct. at 2093).
190. The Oklahoma evidence had been admitted in Missouri "in order to help dem-
onstrate Felix' criminal intent." Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1382.
191. Id. It should be noted that although the Supreme Court rejects, in name, the
"same evidence" test, that does not appear to be a rejection of the approach employed
in Louisiana to determine whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes.
In fact, after Grady and Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 2265
(1980), the test for determining what is the same offense for double jeopardy purposes
appears to be equivalent under federal and state law. Compare State v. Didier, 262 So.
2d 322 (1972) (referring to the Louisiana approach as the "same evidence" test).
The "same evidence" test employed in Louisiana is applied differently than the "same
evidence" test rejected in Felix. Under Louisiana law, the "same evidence" test bars a
subsequent prosecution only if evidence necessary to convict on one offense is sufficient
to convict on the other. Didier, 262 So. 2d at 322; State v. Cotton, 438 So. 2d 1156,
1160 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 606 (1984). That approach is
different from the "same evidence" test as defined in Felix, where the Court of Appeals
held that simply because there was an overlap in evidence, there was a double jeopardy
bar to the second prosecution. Felix, 926 F.2d at 1528-29.
192. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1384-85. See also La. R.S. 14:26 (1986), which provides: "If
the intended basic crime has been consummated, the conspirators may be tried for either
the conspiracy or the completed offense, and a conviction for one shall not bar prosecution
for the other." Another limitation on an expansive reading of Grady can be found in
United States v. Parker, 960 F.2d. 498, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that Grady's
supplement to the test employed in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52
S. Ct. 180, 182 (1932), for determining when two offenses are the same, is only applicable
to successive prosecutions).
193. 952 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3029 (1992).
194. Id. at 869-70. Some time after the defendants' conictions, the United States
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claim that it should review the sufficiency of the evidence at the first
trial to determine whether the government had sufficiently proved what
was now understood to be the elements of the charged offense.19 6 Al-
though Fifth Circuit jurisprudence supported the defendants' claim,' 9
the court held that the defendants, in this appeal, were not entitled to
a review of the sufficiency of the evidence at the first trial. 98
The scenario in Miller will only result when there has been a con-
viction and setting aside of that conviction for reasons other than
insufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, the court addressed the proper
procedure following a defendant's initial conviction. Despite denying the
defendants' claims in this appeal, the court indicated that when the
errors in the initial trial are considered on appeal (and one would assume
in a post-conviction motion in the trial court), the issue of sufficiency
of the evidence should be considered if properly raised.'1 Presumably
the reason for this consideration of sufficiency at that time is to de-
termine if a subsequent prosecution should be barred.
That, however, would appear to be inconsistent with the Miller
court's earlier statements that under Richardson, jeopardy had not ter-
minated and therefore there was no bar to further prosecution.2°° Al-
Supreme Court held that the federal mail fraud provisions require proof of intent to
defraud another of property rights. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360,107 S.
Ct. 2875, 2882 (1987). Based on circuit court opinions that pre-dated McNally, the jury
was not charged on this requirement. The defendants' original convictions were set aside
because the jury instructions allowed conviction without a finding that the defendants
had-deprived another of property rights. Miller, 952 F.2d at 869 n.l.
195. Id. at 874.
196. Id. at 872-74.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Sneed, 705 F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1983). The court
in Miller rejected Sneed as inconsistent with Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317,
104 S. Ct. 381 (1984). Miller, 952 F.2d at 87. Richardson involved a claim by a defendant
that he should have a review of the sufficiency of the government's proof when the jury
failed to reach a verdict. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 319-20, 104 S. Ct. at 3083. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant was not entitled to such a review. Id. at 326, 104 S. Ct.
at 3086.
198. Miller, 952 F.2d at 874. The court, although exercising jurisdiction on this appeal,
ruled that it would not do so in the future. It stated: "In light of our holding today,
future appeals raising similar claims will no longer be colorable and will not be appealable
before final judgment in this Circuit." Id. at 872 n.5 (emphasis added).
The emphasized portion of this quotation might be read as saying that the defendants
could have a review of the sufficiency at the time of the post-conviction appeal. However,
the court set aside any such construction of this language. Id. at 874.
199. The Court stated: "Although not mandated by the double jeopardy clause, it is
accordingly clearly the better practice for the appellate court on an initial appeal to dispose
of any claim properly presented to it that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to
warrant the thus challenged conviction." Id.
200. When discussing the impact of Richardson, the court stated: "Following Ri-
chardson, we hold that double jeopardy does not bar this retrial, and because under
1993]
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though inconsistent with the court's statements about Richardson, review
following the initial conviction would appear to be the better practice
(if not the practice mandated by double jeopardy). Double jeopardy
protects individuals not only from multiple punishments but also from
multiple prosecutions. 20 1 As such, a defendant should be entitled to a
determination of whether the government met its burden of proof at
the first trial. 202 In fact, it could be strongly argued that if the first
appellate court refused to consider the claim, the defendant should not
be here to suffer as a result of that refusal, and the second appellate
court should make this determination. Miller, of course, rejects this
argument.
In United States v. Sanchez-Escareno,20 the defendants contended
that under United States v. Halper2O4 the prosecution against them was
barred under double jeopardy. In Sanchez-Escareno, the defendants had
signed notes in which they unconditionally agreed to pay civil fines
assessed against them for attempting to import marijuana into the United
States. The fines had not actually been paid, and there had been no
effort by the government to collect or enforce the notes. 205 Although
the court ruled that Halper applied whether the civil fine preceded the
criminal prosecution or vice versa, 206 it found that under these facts the
Richardson jeopardy has not terminated, double jeopardy will not be available as a ground
for challenging any subsequent conviction that may result." Id.
201. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223 (1957).
202. Richardson should be limited to its facts. In light of the expansive role of the
harmless error analysis, see supra discussion at notes 135-143 and accompanying text, in
most instances where an appellate court chooses to set aside a conviction on the basis
of some error at the trial, it will be required to review the entire record to determine if
the evidence is otherwise overwhelming. For that reason, any transcription cost or loss
of judicial economy from a rule that requires a sufficiency review would be minimal.
The transcription would have already taken place, and the review for sufficiency is less
onerous than a review to determine whether the evidence is overwhelming.
The Louisiana Supreme Court takes the position that a review for sufficiency is
mandated when the issue is properly raised and that a defendant's conviction raises other
issues on appeal. See State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992). Of course, such a
rule may create practical problems in a case such as Miller where the government is
misled (by prior case law) into believing that the elements of proof are different than
they actually are. Under this belief, it is possible the prosecution may fail to admit evidence
not because it does not have it but because it thinks it unnecessary.
203. 950 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, No. 91-8381, 1992 WL130391
(Oct. 5, 1992).
204. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989). After the defendant's conviction in Halper,
the government filed a civil penalty proceeding based on the same facts as the criminal
conviction. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to the civil penalty
proceeding under these facts and limited the amount that the government could recover.
The government would not be allowed to recover civil penalties in an amount which is
so disproportionate to its losses and expenses as to make the civil penalty additional
punishment. Id. at 449-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1902-03.
205. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d at 197.
206. Id. at 200. But see United States v. Woods, 949 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1991) (per
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defendants were not subjected to any "punishment" sufficient to trigger
a double jeopardy bar to. their subsequent prosecution on drug impor-
tation charges. 07
In Sanchez-Escareno, the fines had not been assessed following some
judicial proceedings. The defendants merely signed the notes upon de-
mand that they do so.20 Had a civil proceeding been instituted which
resulted in the assessment of the fines, the issue may have been dif-
ferent. 209 Just as the civil fine might be considered punishment for the
purposes of double jeopardy, the proceeding resulting in such a fine
might be considered criminal for the same purposes. Accordingly, in a
case where the civil fine of sufficient magnitude (to be considered
"punishment") results from a judicial proceeding (even if not yet paid),
double jeopardy would appear to bar the subsequent criminal trial.210
To hold otherwise would result in the defendant being subjected to a
"second prosecution for the same offense after conviction."' '
F. Commitment Proceedings
Under Louisiana law, a criminal defendant found not guilty by
reason of insanity may be committed to an appropriate treatment fa-
cility. 212 If the review panel at the treatment facility recommends the
defendant be released, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine
whether the defendant is dangerous to himself or others. 213 If he is
found to be dangerous, he may be returned to and held in the facility
even though the dangerousness does not result from a mental illness.
214
curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1562 (1992). In Woods, the court held that the prosecution
of an owner of a savings and loan association for bank fraud did not subject the owner
to double jeopardy. The association had previously been placed in receivership by the
government, but the court found that this was not punishment against the owner and
therefore was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the owner. The court noted that
the receivership was directed against the association and not the owner and was not a
punishment but intended to protect the United States treasury by assuring proper man-
agement of the thrift according to the banking regulations. The court also concluded that
no act taken in the receivership was retributive or meant as a deterrent. Id. at 176-77.
207. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d at 201-03.
208. Id. at 195-97.
209. As the court pointed out, there was no contention of multiple prosecutions: "[N]o
one contends that here the defendants are being prosecuted again after a prior acquittal
or conviction at an earlier trial." Id. at 198.
210. As noted by the court, double jeopardy "affords a trio of protections to the
criminal defendant: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction;
and protection against multiple punishment for the same offense imposed in a single
proceeding." Id. at 197 (citations omitted).
211. Id.
212. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 654.
213. La. Code Crim. P. art. 655.
214. La. Code Crim. P. art. 657.
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The defendant in Foucha v. Louisiana215 had been acquitted of the
charges against him on the basis of insanity and confined to a mental
institution. At the hearing to determine whether he should be released,
the testimony revealed that Foucha had recovered from the mental illness
he had suffered at the time of the offenses and was "in good shape"
mentally. 216 The testimony also revealed, however, that Foucha had an
antisocial personality. 2 7 As a result of his antisocial personality, Foucha
had been involved in several fights at the treatment facility. 2 s Accord-
ingly, "the doctor testifying did not 'feel comfortable in certifying that
[he] would not be a danger to himself or to other people."' 21 9
Based, in part, on this testimony, the state court ordered Foucha
returned to the mental institution. The United States Supreme Court
concluded that to the extent that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
article 657 allowed continued detention under these circumstances, it
violates the federal constitutional mandate. Civil commitments under
Louisiana law require a showing that the confined person is both mentally
ill and a danger to himself or others. 2 0 Under Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 657, as applied in Foucha, only the latter
finding is necessary to commit or continue to hold an insanity acquittee.
The Court reasoned that because the statute allowed Foucha to be
committed to a mental institution under a different criteria than a person
not previously charged and acquitted of an offense, the provision violated
his right to due process and equal protection. 221
The Court distinguished United States v. Jones.222 In Jones, the
Court had held that the insanity acquittal was sufficient to justify a
short detention without any other determination of need to commit. 223
The Court in Jones also sustained against constitutional attack the
shifting of the burden of proof to the acquittee to show grounds for
release. 22 Jones was distinguished on the basis that although a short
commitment was authorized under a different standard and the burden
to prove release was shifted to the defendant, the standard for a con-
215. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
216. Id. at 1782. At the time of the commission of the offense, Foucha was suffering
from a drug induced psychosis.
217. This personality trait was not linked to a mental disease. Id.
218. Id. at 1782-83.
219. Id. at 1783.
220. Id. at 1788.
221. Id. at 1787-89.
222. 463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
223. This procedure differed from civil commitments, which required proof of the
need for commitment before the person could be civilly committed.' Jones, 463 U.S. at
366-67, 103 S. Ct. at 3050-51.
224. Id. at 364-66, 103 S. Ct. at 3049-50.
[Vol. 53
1993] CRIMINAL LA W AND PROCEDURE 807
tinued commitment was the same for civil and insanity acquittee com-
mitments. 5
225. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (1992).

